Analysis of RT distributions in the remember-know paradigm.
Do remembering and knowing differ qualitatively (reflecting distinct underlying processes) or quantitatively (reflecting different levels of strength)? Broadly speaking, models of remember-know judgments based on these alternatives have been tested by examining the proportion of remember and know responses that are made across conditions or levels of confidence. Here, we consider reaction time (RT) data. We replicate Dewhurst and Conway's (1994) observation that old judgments followed by remember responses are faster, on average, than those followed by know decisions, but show that this effect is largely due to differing distributions of remember and know responses across confidence levels. In addition, fits of ex-Gaussian distributions of hit RTs followed by either remember or know judgments yield similar parameter values when confidence level is controlled. Thus, these RT data do not provide strong support for the idea that remembering and knowing depend on different processes.